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THE PORCUPINE'S DILEMMA:
STRATEGIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY
IN THE FACE OF GLOBAL WARMING
Wflliam H. Rodgers, Jr.*
L INTRODUCTION:
THE NEED FOR EXPERIMENTATION AND RAPID RESPONSE
When confronted with questions of human adaptation to felt necessity,
some lessons can be learned from the teachings of natural history. Let me
look to the common porcupine for some metaphorical instruction.' The
principal risks porcupines face come not from predators (who [automobiles
excepted] are deterred so well by the arsenal of quills) but from their physical
environment, especially from the fixed laws of gravity and the changing
vagaries of climate. It so happens that porcupines are overanned and
overweight. They spend a lifetime traveling around in trees that are ill-
equipped to support them; slips and falls are frequent, and virtually every
porcupine suffers from broken bones, not to mention the self-inflicted quill
wounds that are a necessary consequence of their heavy armament. Porcu-
pines do the best they can to cope, of course, with various tentative, experi-
mental, and don't-go-too-far-out-on-the-limb strategies, but the law of
gravity is relentless and unforgiving.
Porcupines also confront sharp discontinuities in their decisional worlds,
primarily because the chemistry of the leaves upon which they feed changes
rapidly in step with the change of seasons. If you are feeding on birch and
it is time to move on to aspen, you must make the switch quickly if you wish
to maintain your reputation as an efficient porcupine. Empirically, it turns
out, porcupines are extraordinarily good judges of their dietary options.
Note, by the way, that the requirement that they keep pace with climate-in-
duced changes in leaf chemistry means that porcupines must do a lot of
traveling. Coping with their climate-environment forces them to confront
risks in their predator-and gravity-environments.
It should be emphasized that the porcupine's existence is ruled by uncer-
tainty in various guises and forms: in the margin of safety that expires at the
end of every dead limb, in the chaotics of weather patterns that betray when
least expected, and in the vagaries of traffic patterns that bring the risk of
death to every country road.
*Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. See generally, Uldis Roze, The North American Porcupine (1989).
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H. THE LAW AND THE PROBLEM
OF INDISCRIMINATE RESPONSE
It was surprising to this observer that in the course of this Conference little
mention was made of the concept of systems analysis. What I mean by
systems analysis is an examination of the full roster of options or responses
or adaptations that a society can undertake to combat an environmental threat.
The law, and environmental law in particular, is often crudely indiscrimi-
nate in selecting among competing options. The issue is not whether there
will be adaptation, but rather who adapts.
Consider the problem of noise from jet airplanes. What do you do about
this problem? According to the carriers, the solution is bigger airports. It's
a land use problem. But according to the airport operators, the answer is
quieter planes. It's an issue of technology control. Yet from the point of
view of equipment manufacturers, the focus instead should be on careless
airline employees. If the pilots were better able to manage the aircraft-keep
'em high and bring them in over the river-then these other costly adjust-
ments in the system would be unnecessary. So the solution from one
perspective is improved operations, from another it's better technology, and
from still another it's more space.
Consider also the spill of the Exxon Valdez. It has been said that the
accident was the product of a combination of failures that included erratic
navigation under the supervision of a drunken captain in a shoddy vessel set
loose with inadequate contingency plans. 2 The Congress aimed fixes indis-
criminately across this spectrum of navigation, operations, vessel condition,
and planning.3 An automatic navigation ight is prescribed for Bligh Reef in
Alaska's Prince William Sound.4 Drunk driving records must now appear
in the course of granting a merchant mariner's license.5 The second-in-com-
mand can take over a vessel temporarily if two of the next most senior
licensed officers believe the master is drunk or incapacitated by drugs. 6 A
rule on the subject of when vessels can be operated with the auto-pilot
engaged must be debated and adopted.7 The Exxon Valdez itself is banished
from the waters of the Sound.8 Sister tankers will be built with double-hull
2. See Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59
G. Wash. L. Rev. 781, 782-84 (1991) for an account of the accident. See also William H.
Rodgers, Jr., 2 Environmental Law: Air & Water (1992 Supp., Preface). The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 is codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761.
3. The Prince William Sound provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2753.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 2733.
5. 46 U.S.C. § 7702(c)(2).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 8101(i).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 2734(2).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 2737.
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construction.9 A new regime of contingency planning is to be put in place. 0
Obviously, statutes such as these place enormous faith in the capacities of
human institutions and human beings, and on the ability of law to bring about
behavioral change. Behind the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are a variety of
assumptions about bad-weather observations, upstart second-officers, clever
programmers, casual use of the auto-pilot, aggressive engineers and careful
planners.
These examples of jet noise and oil spills are mentioned to underscore the
necessity of not only identifying options for resisting the anticipated global
warming but also evaluating the plausibility of whether humans can respond
in the fashion expected of them. Porcupines have constraints upon their
behavioral repertoires, and so do humans. Indeed, the challenges to species-
specific predilections are profound in the context of global warming. Plan-
ning with strangers around the globe across time frames measured in
hundreds of years to combat risks dimly perceived does not come easily to
the human primate not long removed from the savannahs of east Africa.
Predictably, while the United States goes about deciding whether global
warming is a problem and what to do about it, not a great deal of attention is
being given to the question of what we are equipped to do if we decide to do
something.
1
'
III. UNCERTAINTY: STRATEGIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
Let me approach this aspect of our problem through the medium of a
fascinating book by the historian Simon Schama: "Dead Certainties (Unwar-
ranted Speculations).' 12 Schama gives a riveting account of the nineteenth-
century Boston murder trial of Harvard chemistry professor, John Webster,
who was charged with killing a colleague in a dispute over a debt, dismem-
bering the body and disposing of it in strategic places around the medical
college. The victim was historian George Parkman, and the story is a
gripping whodunit filled with vivid descriptions of events ("pieces of Park-
man were coming together"), 13 and characters such as the attorney Rufus
Choate (whose "whole person was a carefully organized dramatic specta-
cle")14 and the presiding Judge Lemuel Shaw who "sat like a great warty toad
9. 46 U.S.C. § 3703a.
10. 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d)(6)(D).
11. Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, National Research Council,
Global Environmental Change: Understanding the Human Dimensions (1992) (recommending
increased research on the human dimensions of global change); See Wallace S. Broecker, Global
Warming on Trial, Nat. Hist., Apr. 1992, at 6, for the prospects of population growth swamping
ever ambitious efforts to combat greenhouse gases.
12. Simon Schama, Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations) (1991).
13. Id. at 220.
14. Id. at 187.
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at the centre of the bench-immovable, unblinking, broad nostrils occasion-
ally flaring at the suggestion of some impropriety, embodying in his bulk the
very weight of justice." 15
Like most good murder mysteries, the evidence in Dead Certainties was
wholly circumstantial-Webster had motive (he had not paid his debts),
opportunity (Parkman had come to visit him), and provocation (more than
once he had felt the keen lash of Parkman's temper). But it was the
uncertainty that made the case so ticklish. Let me put this uncertainty into
the categories of the strategic and the psychological.
In those days of primitive forensics, before blood tests and DNA finger-
printing, considerable doubt attended the question of whether the various
body parts that were found added up to the whole of the missing esteemed
professor. In a burst of creative energy, one of the expert witnesses produced
on an easel before the court a life-size drawing of a skeleton that bore an
unmistakable resemblance to Dr. Parkman whose gangly figure was no
longer seen on the streets of Boston:
Turned to left profile, it was apparent that this was not some general-
ized skeletal diagram. The protruding jaw, the long neck, all an-
nounced a very particular personality. As if it were not already vivid
enough, he was shown with his arms swinging, the left leg extended
backwards, toes pointing to the ground. It was the Pedestrian to the
life, moving briskly towards the accused. 16
But the defense would not concede the field of uncertainty so easily.
Defense lawyers found a famous dentist who couldn't say whether this jaw
belonged to Dr. Parkman. And they "called a parade of seven witnesses, all
of whom swore they had in fact seen Dr. Parkman in the afternoon of the
twenty-third when, according to the prosecution, he was already lying dead
inside the College. [These witnesses] were all unequivocal about their
recollection." 17 In rebuttal, the Attorney General proposed to call a group of
witnesses who thought they had seen Dr. Parkman during the crucial time
period but upon speaking to the person, had discovered that they were
mistaken. This rebuttal evidence was not accepted.
Here is a lesson in what I would call strategic uncertainty. There is no
direct evidence available from anyone who spoke to Dr. Parkman. There is
an unlimited supply of indirect evidence available from witnesses who
thought they saw Dr. Parkman. The ultimate question-whether Dr. Park-
man was alive at the time-is unanswerable given available techniques. Yet
prospects for attempting to answer it imperfectly are unlimited. What should
we do?
15. Id. at 198-99.
16. Id. at 220-21.17. Id. at 241.
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This question of whether Dr. Parkman was living on that crucial day is
suggestive of several of the issues surrounding global warming-most
prominently, the question of predicting regional or local effects. From Dr.
John Gibbon's Conference paper, "Decisionmaking in the Face of Uncer-
tainty", it appears that the question is not answerable. Attempts to do so run
into impossibility theorems having to do with the chaotic and nonlinear
nature of the behavior under consideration.18 For participants in the exercise,
though, there remains the temptation to accumulate more indirect evidence;
there will always be another witness who thought he saw Dr. Parkman.
Therefore, the problem for policymakers is to determine whether, when, and
how strategies of "more study" should be adopted. The history of environ-
mental law offers hundreds of examples of forced choices between action,
study and combinations of the two.' 9 Suffice it to say that there are good and
bad versions of policy, science and politics that support "more study"
outcomes. That is why the issue can be characterized as an instance of
strategic uncertainty.
Let me identify another construct of uncertainty that was developed nicely
in the context of the missing Dr. Parkman. An observer at the trial made the
telling point that "confusion and uncertainty" alone was an insufficient
defense, even in light of the technical requirement that murder must be
proven beyond all reasonable doubt. Why? Because "these good ordinary
men [of the jury] do not wish to be confused; the precise instinct of the
locksmith and the printer, the accounting of the clerk and the dry goods
merchant, all rebel against it. Give them an alternative story they can
superimpose over the histories of [the witnesses] and they perhaps may prefer
it. But give them only uncertainty and they will squirm with unhappiness
like children sent to bed without their story's end."20
In the Webster trial, an alternative and plausible scenario was produced,
but it did not work to the benefit of the defense. Pliny Merrick, counsel for
Webster, took the plunge by addressing the delicate question of whether a
homicide, if proven, would constitute murder or manslaughter. To answer
this question, Merrick said, I must "assume that the homicide was committed
by the prisoner at the bar and I must assume also for the purposes of this
examination the existence and the truth of the various facts of which the
Government have supplied you with evidence." This was a dangerous tack,
as Schama explained:
18. See John L. Casti, Searching for Certainty: What Scientists Can Know About the Future
(1990). See also Broecker, supra note 11, at 8. ("The global warming that caused the demise of
the little Ice Age confuses attempts to estimate how much of the last century's warming is neutral
and how much has been caused by pumping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.").
19. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., 3 Environmental Law: Pesticides & Toxic Substances §
7.1(D) (1988).
20. Dead Certainties, supra note 12 at 243.
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law [Vol. 9, No. 1
"Assume," such a little, little word, Bemis thought. For gentlemen
such as him and me and all the Harvard classmates sitting in this room,
it signifies something hypothetical, suppositious, intellectually experi-
mental. But, my learned friend and fool, you have assumed too much;
you have used it to those good tradesmen and mechanics over there.
They are more accustomed to hearing it mean "take for granted" as in
"we may assume you owe me twenty dollars for these groceries." 21
Schama continued:
It got still better in the afternoon. For when, at last, Merrick turned
narrator, the story he related (and did so pretty well), was one which
set yet again in the jury's mind the indelible image of a distracted,
prodigal man attacking his creditor. It was, he said, a tale of passion,
and it is impossible to know how men will conduct themselves under
the domination of passion in its highest excitement. Professor Webster
occupied an important position-was a man of good standing in
society. He had a wife and daughters dependent upon his professional
labors and ability; he was poor, and all before him might look like ruin
and desolation. While his blood was hot and his passion high and his
victim just slain, suppose that he commits just one rash act more.
There, surrounded as he was by walls which excluded the presence of
all witnesses and shut out all human observation the temptation might
come upon him to conceal; and the mutilation of the body would mark
the first act of concealment.
Bemis thought: Well, you surely have convinced me, my friend.22
Much of this Conference, of course, has been devoted to the presentation
of plausible and alternative scenarios associated With global warming. Doing
nothing is not strongly recommended. Yet the details of policies-that-
should-be are hardly in focus either. In this context, the fortuitous appear-
ance of "no regrets" options23 are almost too good to be true. We can accept
the predictions of global warming, take meaningful steps to remedy the
threat, yet preserve flexibility of choice for the future. Together with the
porcupine, we can avoid going too far out on the limb.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Changing by Degrees: Steps to
Reduce Greenhouse Gases 4 (Feb. 1991) (Box I-A) ("Many of the technical options evaluated
here are worth pursuing for other reasons in addition to climate change, because they address
other important U.S. goals such as energy security, local environmental quality, and economic
competitiveness. They can reduce emissions in the short-term, reduce total energy demand, and
serve to bridge the U.S. economy from a fossil-fuel age to a nonfossil future.").
